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As policy evaluation matures, thoughts are turning to its governance. However, few 
scholars have combined insights from the evaluation and governance literatures to shed 
new light on this matter. In order to address this important gap, this paper develops a new 
typology of ways to comprehend and perhaps ultimately govern ex-post policy evaluation 
activities. The paper then explores its validity in the context of climate policy evaluation 
activities, a vibrant policy area in which the demand for and practices of evaluation have 
grown fast, particularly in Europe. The analysis reveals that the typology usefully guides 
new thinking, but also highlights important gaps in our empirical knowledge of the 
various modes of governing policy evaluation. The paper identifies a need for a new 
research agenda that simultaneously develops a fuller understanding of these evaluation 
practices and the options for governing them. 
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Introduction 
 
Governance scholars have spent many decades conceptualizing and empiricising 
the various forms of governance, whether they be hierarchical, decentralized or 
networked (Levi-Faur, 2012). However, somewhat surprisingly, few attempts have been 
made to apply these insights to the practice of ex-post policy evaluation. This paper 
follows Vedung (1997, p. 3) in defining policy evaluation as a “careful retrospective 
assessment of the merit, worth, and value of administration, output and outcome of 
government interventions, which is intended to play a role in future practical action 
situations.” 
The lack of sustained attention given to the governance of evaluation activities 
may stem from the fact that evaluation has thus far mainly been considered in highly 
specialized communities, in which (important) tasks such as developing evaluation 
methodologies, guidance for making value judgements, and accounting for patterns of 
knowledge utilization have been deemed to be especially paramount (e.g., Alkin & 
Christie, 2004; Patton, 1997; Pawson & Tilley, 1997; Vedung, 1997). By contrast, the 
various ways of organizing - or governing - evaluation have not been explicitly addressed 
in recent typologies and ‘theories about the practice of evaluation’ (Leeuw & Donaldson, 
2015, p. 470). Given the growing attention to and interest in policy evaluation by policy-
makers and others (e.g., EEA, 2016), coupled with a corresponding growth in 
investments in evaluation, growing evaluation communities, evaluation activities, and 
outputs (e.g., Jacob, Speer & Furubo, 2015; Furubo, Rist, & Sandahl, 2002; Mastenbroek 
et al., 2015; Toulemonde, 2000), now seems an opportune moment to pose important 
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questions about the governance of evaluation itself (see, for example, Hanberger, 2012; 
Stame, 2006).  
This paper seeks to develop a new typology in order to comprehend patterns of 
ex-post evaluation conducted by many different kinds of organizations and to provide 
options for perhaps ultimately governing evaluation. These two objectives will hopefully 
make the paper relevant not only for evaluation theorists, but also for practitioners who 
may wrestle with more applied questions on how to organize evaluation activities. Our 
typology draws on the well-known distinction between formal and informal evaluation 
activities (e.g., Weiss, 1993; Hildén et al., 2014). It also draws on new thinking from 
polycentric governance, that is, governance activities spread across multiple independent 
governance centres and levels (see V. Ostrom, 1999), in order to provide deeper insights 
into the relative merits of conceptualizing and ultimately governing evaluation in more or 
less hierarchical ways. It also builds on the efforts of earlier scholars, who have advanced 
the concept of ‘evaluation policy’, which refers to managing evaluations within a single 
organization (e.g., Trochim, 2009). In doing so, this paper problematizes deeper and more 
long-standing assumptions about what constitutes ‘good’ evaluation practice. Evaluation 
scholars have implicitly raised these questions before. Writing in the pages of this 
journal, Jacob, Speer and Furubo (2015) considered pluralistic evaluation systems to be 
more advanced than monocentric or hierarchical ones, but did not fully justify and 
evidence their claims. Their attempt was symptomatic of a collective failure to draw on 
governance theories to comprehend evaluation activities, which often bring together 
multiple actors and interests. 
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However, this is not for want of trying. For example, a decade ago Mickwitz 
(2006, p. 71) asked: 
Should the evaluation requirement of EU environmental policies be 
operationalized by the EU Commission commissioning evaluations? Or by the 
Council, the Parliament, the Member States or perhaps by the European 
Environment Agency? Should there be some institutions with specific capacities 
to conduct evaluations, as in some countries and sectors and what are the pros and 
cons of different structures? 
 
These remain highly pertinent questions, not least in the context of the transparency 
provisions in the Paris Agreement on climate change (Schoenefeld et al., 2016; 
UNFCCC, 2015). Whilst there is some knowledge about the political struggles that have 
emerged around the allocation of evaluation roles to particular institutions (Martens, 
2010), in the case of climate and environmental policies, evaluation and governance 
scholars have made notably little progress in jointly conceptualizing and perhaps 
ultimately governing evaluation practices.  
This paper draws on the empirical case of environment and particularly climate 
change policy evaluation in the European Union (EU) in order to test the new typology. 
Although these were not the first sectors in which EU policy evaluation developed (see 
Stame, 2003; 2006; Mickwitz, 2006; Crabbé & Leroy, 2008; Toulemonde, 2000), recent 
studies have revealed them to be especially dynamic sites of ex-post evaluation (e.g., 
EEA, 2016; Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2011; Hildén et al., 2014; Hildén, 2011; 
Mickwitz, 2013). The European Environment Agency recently argued that “[t]he 
evaluation of environment and climate policies is, today, a well-established discipline” 
(EEA, 2016, p. 4). Correspondingly, Huitema and colleagues (2011) found 259 ex-post 
climate policy evaluation documents between 1998 and 2007 (see also Haug et al., 2010). 
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Similarly, at the time of this writing, a German database of energy policy ‘studies’ lists 
243 documents related to ‘climate change’.2 
Policy evaluation in the EU receives considerable attention from high-level policy 
actors (see Mickwitz, 2013), such as the European Commission (e.g., Mastenbroek et al., 
2015), the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2016; Martens, 2010; Hildén et al., 
2014), the European Court of Auditors (Stephenson, 2015) and the Member States 
(Furubo, Rist & Sandahl, 2002). Stern (2009) has estimated that the European institutions 
spend approximately 45 million Euros per year on evaluation; Hojlund (2015) has 
calculated that the European Commission alone employs 140 staff to manage it. 
However, government-driven climate policy evaluation activities remain highly 
differentiated across the EU, where countries such as Germany and the UK have 
significant evaluation capacities, but southern and new member states exhibit much lower 
activity levels (AEA, ECOFYS, Fraunhofer, & ICCS, 2009, p. 33; Jacob, Speer, & 
Furubo, 2015). Outside government, there are also many other actors, such as 
environmental groups, that should be accounted for (e.g., Haug et al., 2010; Hildén et al., 
2014; Huitema et al., 2011; Mickwitz, 2013). Growing attention to evaluation and a wide 
variety of actors, practices, and evaluation outputs make climate policy a suitable area in 
which to explore the everyday practices and governance of evaluation within a single 
political system, namely the EU (see also Stern, 2009; Jacob, Speer & Furubo, 2015). 
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows: in the second section, the paper 
draws on evaluation literatures to review the important distinction between formal (i.e. 
state-led) and informal (i.e. society-led) policy evaluation actors. The third section draws 
                                                 
2 http://www.forschungsradar.de/studiendatenbank.html 
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on (polycentric) governance literatures to develop a second continuum ranging from 
hierarchical to polycentric ways of conceptualizing evaluation. These two continua 
inform a new typology, which the paper introduces in the fourth section, and then 
discusses in detail with a view to understanding on-going climate policy evaluation 
activities in the EU, as documented in the existing literature. The fifth section discusses 
our results and reflects on the fruitfulness of the typology as well as opportunities for new 
research.   
 
Formal or informal evaluation? 
 
For analytical purposes, evaluation scholars have found it useful to distinguish 
between formal (i.e., government-driven) and informal (i.e., society-driven) modes of 
evaluation. In a ground-breaking article, Weiss (1993) distinguished between ‘inside 
evaluation’ conducted by people ‘inside’ government, and ‘outside’ evaluation by actors 
not linked with government (see also Conley-Tyler, 2005). Other researchers have 
developed the related notions of ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ evaluation in the EU (Hildén 
et al., 2014; Huitema et al., 2011). Hildén and colleagues (2014) define formal evaluation 
as ‘state-led’ and informal evaluation as ‘evaluation activities by non-state actors’ (p. 
885). Crucial for this paper is the fact that each mode comes with a set of potential 
strengths and weaknesses, which the following section considers. 
 
Formal evaluation 
In-house or formal evaluators may have intimate knowledge of policy processes 
and the circumstances under which a particular policy emerged, which may in turn make 
the evaluation more attuned to these and other contextual variables (Weiss, 1993; 
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Toulemonde, 2000). Careful attention to such factors may eventually facilitate the uptake 
of evaluation knowledge later on in the policy process (Weiss, 1993), an issue that 
remains a core concern amongst scholars evaluation (see, for example, Albaek, 1995; 
Chelimsky, 2006; Fischer, 2006; Hertting & Vedung, 2012; Patton, 1997; Toulemonde, 
2000). Furthermore, if governmental actors fund evaluation activities, they may be under 
considerable pressure to act upon related findings, or respond to them publically. 
Conversely, formal evaluation also has well known weaknesses. Evaluation 
findings by governmental evaluation actors may be less critical of a given policy and its 
outcomes than evaluative knowledge generated by non-state actors (Weiss, 1993). 
Political pressures to ‘look good’ and avoid negative evaluations may be immense and 
thus inhibit formal actors from being too critical. Or formal evaluators may knowingly or 
unknowingly seek evidence in order to support their pre-existing hypotheses or views on 
a policy by way of a ‘confirmation bias’ (see Nickerson, 1998). And if unfavourable 
evaluation results do emerge, governmental actors may have an incentive to suppress 
them or not draw attention to them if they are published – an important issue, given that 
evaluation can also inform public debates (Chelimsky, 2006). Evaluation scholars have 
long argued that it is important to protect the independence of evaluators within 
government (see Chelimsky, 2009). 
Such political pressures also emerge when governmental actors commission 
organizations outside government to conduct evaluations. For example, evaluation 
criteria that policy-makers focus on may differ significantly from criteria that those who 
are subjected to a policy may perceive as adequate (Weiss, 1993; Majone, 1989, p. 168). 
Furthermore, the commissioning process may generate principle-agent relationships, 
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which may trigger political struggles around policy evaluation. For example, a recent 
survey of evaluators in the UK revealed how civil servants have attempted to directly 
influence the outcome of evaluations (Hayward et al., 2013); another approach involves 
trying to frame evaluation findings in a more positive light (Weiss, 1993). According to 
Hayward and colleagues (2013), UK civil servants have used a range of strategies to 
achieve this, including controlling the research questions addressed by evaluations, or by 
enacting budgetary-turned-methodological constraints (such as not funding a control 
group). However, interference at earlier stages in the evaluation process appeared more 
popular than influence at later stages (Hayward et al., 2013). More recent research has 
confirmed the existence of these dynamics in other countries (see Pleger & Sager, 2016). 
Another tactic by those who see evaluation as a useless ‘bureaucratic burden’ has been to 
allow evaluators very little time to conduct evaluations, leading to superficial results 
(Toulemonde, 2000). In a similar vein, Stame (2004, p. 504) concluded that: 
“[e]valuation in Europe suffers from being too constrained by the demands of those who 
commission evaluations, and by the regulations that are put in place.” In sum, the 
closeness of formal evaluators to the policy-process may make evaluations more realistic 
and facilitate uptake. However, the findings are likely to be less radical - indeed civil 
servants may have incentives to exert continuing influence over evaluators. 
 
Informal evaluation 
By contrast, evaluations performed by non-state actors may take a more critical 
look at policies (Weiss, 1993). This is because informal evaluators may have fewer 
incentives to ‘look good’ or potentially downplay negative aspects of a policy. In fact, 
informal evaluators—or their funders—may conduct evaluations precisely to expose the 
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shortcomings of policies in order to pressurise policy-makers to respond. The latter may 
generate substantial incentives to bring evaluation results into public discussions (see 
Chelimsky, 2006). By the same token, informal evaluations are more likely to be 
‘reflexive’ (see Fischer, 2006), meaning that they may have more room to critically 
reflect on extant policy objectives. Informal evaluation may also employ a greater range 
of criteria (Mickwitz, 2013) in order to pay more attention to policy side effects (see 
Vedung, 2013) that may not feature in ‘distance to target’ policy evaluation exercises 
conducted by formal evaluators (Hildén et al., 2014). By drawing on non-governmental 
resources, informal evaluation may also be less affected by electoral and budgetary 
cycles, as well as shifting political priorities within government. Crucially, they may in 
principle emerge in the absence of central coordination and stimulation. Of course the 
true extent to which this happens remains an (open) empirical question. 
Informal evaluation activities may also exhibit a range of potential weaknesses. 
Informal evaluators may not have detailed ‘inside’ knowledge and may thus overlook key 
aspects of a policy or be oblivious to the (political) process through which a policy first 
emerged (Weiss, 1993). More critical evaluation results may also prove much less 
palatable for policy-makers, thus leading to a lower uptake of evaluation knowledge or 
potentially even outright resistance. Informal actors may simply struggle to fund costly 
and rigorous evaluation exercises. For example, Löwenbein (2008) estimated a cost of 
about one hundred thousand Euros per evaluation of a German structural fund project. In 
comparison to many governmental actors, all but the most well-funded non-governmental 
actors may struggle to muster such resources (see Greenwood, 2011, p. 136-141). The 
aforementioned 45 million Euros spent by the EU institutions on evaluation every year 
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(Stern, 2009), for example, amounts to more than ten times the total budget of the 
WWF’s European Policy Office (which is one of the best-funded in Brussels).3 By the 
same token, informal actors may also have vested interests that diverge from the interests 
of the wider public. If they have a more or less pre-determined view of preferred policy 
outcomes, it too can lead to ‘confirmation bias’. Substantial funding (such as that 
available to the fossil fuel industries in the case of climate change) may generate a 
situation where ‘money evaluates’, rather than evaluators, compromising idealised 
visions of ‘systematic’ or ‘pluralistic’ evaluation (see Jacob, Speer & Furubo, 2015). In 
short, formal and informal evaluators and/or their funders may have considerable 
incentives to use policy evaluation as another weapon in policy battles. It is thus an open 
question as to whether evaluation activities really emerge organically from the bottom up 
- a point to which the paper shall return. 
 
Summary 
With a view to individual policy evaluations, there are thus numerous 
considerations that flow from the involvement of formal and informal actors in evaluation 
(see Table 1). There is, in short, no approach which is obviously ‘better’ – each has 
strengths and weaknesses. Drawing on the work of polycentric governance scholars, it is 
likely that the efficacy of different approaches depends on their ‘fit’ with overall socio-
political circumstances (see E. Ostrom, 1990). However, if evaluation is to contribute to a 
better understanding of socio-environmental systems, it cannot be limited to evaluating 
single policies. Thus a key question is how to govern the evaluation of multiple policies 
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across many scales and sectors of governance, such as exists in the EU. In the EU, 
governors have deployed well over one thousand separate policies to address climate 
change (Schoenefeld et al., 2016). The following section unpacks the strengths and 
weaknesses of two potential forms of organising evaluation activities, namely 
hierarchical and polycentric. 
 
 
 
Hierarchical or polycentric evaluation? 
 
So far, the discussion has more or less assumed one level of governance and 
hence level of evaluation activities. However, in line with many other governance 
processes, policy evaluation has evolved into an increasingly multi-level affair (see 
Hooghe & Marks, 2010; Stame, 2008). In order to capture this aspect, we differentiate 
between two ways of governing: hierarchical (or top-down evaluation) conducted and 
coordinated by a central actor; and more decentralised (or polycentric) potentially 
conducted by ‘self-organising’ evaluators. This section disentangles the strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. 
 
Hierarchical evaluation 
In principle, evaluation activities organised by a single actor – which could be but 
need not necessarily be a state - exhibit several strengths. A single evaluator (or 
institution) may be able to set common evaluation standards and thereby make the results 
across multiple policies more comparable, which is a key concern, especially regarding 
Insert Table 1 here. 
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climate policy (e.g., Aldy & Pizer, 2015; Aldy, Pizer & Akimoto, 2016; Feldman & Wilt, 
1996; Purdon, 2015; Schoenefeld et al., 2016). A single evaluator may also have greater 
resources than multiple smaller actors, which may translate into stronger evaluation 
capacities. Hierarchical evaluation can also facilitate the coordination of evaluation 
activities in order to avoid duplication of costly analysis, and provide one central location 
from which evaluative knowledge diffuses. Crucially, a central actor may be able to exert 
the ‘political pressure’ needed to foster effective coordination of evaluation (for related 
arguments on policy coordination, see Jordan & Schout, 2006, p. 271; Peters, 1998). For 
example, De Burca and colleagues (2014) suggest that in a context of ‘global 
experimentalist governance’, “a new kind of centre [is required], pooling information and 
organizing peer evaluation of it, and on occasion responding to (or invoking the threat of) 
a penalty default” (p. 478-79). 
By the same token, hierarchically-organised evaluation may also suffer from 
several weaknesses. For example, streamlined standards may prove insensitive to 
contextual effects, such as (un)intended side effects, which can be crucial factors in 
judging the success and/or failure of particular policies (e.g., E. Ostrom, 2010; 
Thompson, Rausch, Saari, & Selin, 2014). For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the main provider of authoritative scientific advice to 
governments, has highlighted many potentially beneficial side effects of climate policy. 
But it remains questionable whether standardising evaluation adequately captures them 
all (Somanathan et al., 2014). Furthermore, centrally organised evaluation can be 
perceived as a way of ‘policing’ policy performance aimed at control, which could 
potentially provoke resistance from lower-level actors (see Stame, 2008; Schoenefeld et 
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al., 2016). If such resistance morphs into minimal or even no cooperation, the quality of 
evaluation may suffer since evaluators may for example depend on information from the 
actors who are being evaluated (Chelimsky, 2006). Hierarchically organised evaluation 
may also suffer from higher risks of systemic failure, given that it may be difficult to 
change approaches and standards if they prove unsuitable (for the general argument, see 
E. Ostrom, 2010). Or it may simply miss more innovative policies, which have not yet 
been incorporated into formal monitoring and evaluation systems. Finally, in many 
settings, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), a single, hierarchical evaluation actor may simply be politically infeasible in 
the short term. 
 
Polycentric evaluation 
If, as Carlsson (2000) suggests, complex policy environments benefit from more 
bottom-up evaluation methodologies, then what about the actors that function at ‘the 
bottom’? The strengths and weaknesses of polycentric evaluation are the inverse of 
hierarchical evaluation. Polycentric evaluation in principle exhibits more flexibility and 
sensitivity to context as evaluators can adjust evaluation criteria to local circumstances. 
According to classic arguments by polycentric governance scholars, this flexibility 
translates into lower risk of systemic failure, because evaluators can address problems 
locally, and failure in one part of the evaluation system does not necessarily generate 
systemic failures (see E. Ostrom, 2010). Furthermore, more local evaluation may lead to 
more local ownership of evaluation results, and reduce perceptions that they are being 
‘policed’ from the top. Local ownership could also lead to a greater uptake of evaluation 
knowledge. Finally, local actors may face incentives to spread their evaluation findings to 
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others and even profit from them. Particularly early adopters may want to share their 
experiences with others and thus engage in consulting activities. Crucially, polycentric 
evaluation does not rely on a single evaluation actor and thus proves more suitable to 
situations in which a dominant governor does not exist, as is currently the case with many 
transnational efforts to address climate change (Chan et al., 2016; Ostrom, 2014; 
Widerberg & Stripple, 2016). 
Polycentric evaluation may, however, also exhibit a range of weaknesses in the 
absence of a central coordinator. Multiple, localised evaluation standards may stifle the 
ability to compare evaluation results across multiple policies and draw cumulative 
conclusions. Whether or not conversion in evaluation methods and standards happens 
without coordination remains an open question. Relatedly, if evaluation approaches and 
standards change frequently, it can become difficult if not impossible to track policy 
development over time. This may be particularly problematic for policies with long life 
spans, such as those in the climate change area. Given the cost of some evaluation 
activities (see, for example, Löwenbein, 2008), evaluation and evaluative knowledge may 
not be freely available, and thus be subject to of collective action dilemmas identified in 
earlier literatures (e.g., Ostrom, 1990). Furthermore, while early adopters of evaluation 
may be keen to share their findings with others, the incentive to share lessons from failed 
attempts may be much lower or even non-existent. Such experiences are just as important 
as those related to success, because they can prevent others from similar mistakes. But 
who will communicate those failures and related insights? 
Not all agree, however. A key insight from the polycentric governance approach 
(see E. Ostrom, 1990; V. Ostrom, 1999) is that local actors may enjoy considerable self-
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governing capabilities. In recent decades, empirical evidence has emerged which 
emphasises how local actors manage to build enduring institutional systems to monitor 
and govern their local resource use (E. Ostrom, 1990). They may be in a better position to 
govern evaluation in ways that better fit local contexts (E. Ostrom, 1990). In such 
circumstances, panaceas (i.e. ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches based on abstract reasoning 
from first principles) are less likely to work (E. Ostrom, Janssen, & Anderies, 2007). But 
do these insights hold for all evaluation activities? While Elinor Ostrom (2005, p. 280) 
argued that local actors may in principle have the capacity to pool resources in order to 
conduct evaluations, it remains unclear whether and to what extent the self-organisation 
of evaluation is indeed an empirical reality.  
 
Summary 
Taken together, governing evaluation activities hierarchically or polycentrically 
comes with a range of potential strengths and weaknesses, which Table 2 summarises. 
 
 
 
Governing Evaluation 
 
So far, our discussion has revealed that there is no inherently ‘better’ way of 
governing evaluation. In fact combining the two dimensions produces a 2×2 typology 
which opens up a range of potential combinations of strengths and weaknesses. Figure 1 
details four key modes of governing evaluation given that both dimensions 
(formal/informal, hierarchical/polycentric matter. This section asks to what extent it is 
Insert Table 2 here. 
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possible to use this typology to comprehend on-going evaluation activities, and thus 
potentially explore new ways of governing them in the future. Importantly, our typology 
includes both actor types (the two continua) and the standards and methods used by these 
actors (in each of the quadrants). This section draws on the existing literature in order to 
explore the extent to which these four modes can be detected in the EU. In doing so, it 
seeks to provide a basic ‘plausibility probe’ (Eckstein, 2000) of our typology to assess its 
ability to organize extant empirical knowledge and comprehend potential new ways to 
govern evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formal common standards and methods 
The top left corner of Figure 1 harbours formal common standards and methods 
enacted by governmental actors in a hierarchical fashion. At the EU level, considerable 
efforts have been made to harmonise and institutionalise evaluation practices. The 
European Commission – arguably one of the most important advocates and exponents of 
evaluation in the EU (Mickwitz, 2013) – has published a series of communications which 
have sought to encourage and systematize evaluation (European Commission, 1996; 
2007; 2013). A 2007 communication includes a set of evaluation standards in order to 
streamline evaluation, as older standards were perceived to be unable to produce high-
Insert Figure 1 here. 
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quality evaluations. However (and in line with our conceptualisation), the limitations of 
its approach quickly became apparent to scholars. For example, Mickwitz (2013) pointed 
out that the 2007 evaluation standards did not include side effects. Furthermore, the 2007 
communication clearly highlighted the tension between hierarchical control and evaluator 
independence by asserting that “evaluators must be free to present their results without 
compromise or interference, although they should take account of the steering group’s 
comments on evaluation quality and accuracy” (European Commission, 2007, p. 23). 
Evidence from the UK and other countries (see Hayward et al., 2013; Pleger & Sager, 
2016) raises doubts about the feasibility of maintaining such a stance. Stern (2009) too 
wrote that at EU level “there is a widespread perception in the evaluation community that 
independence is not always highly valued” (p. 72). 
Hierarchical forms of evaluation can also trigger considerable resistance from 
lower levels (Stame, 2008), a tendency which can certainly be observed in EU climate 
policy. As signatories of the UNFCCC, from 1993 the EU member states implemented 
greenhouse gas emission and eventually policy reporting requirements through a bottom-
up ‘Monitoring Mechanism’ (Haigh, 1996; Hyvarinen, 1999). Although many EU 
member states have signed up to the need for more ex-post evaluation in principle, in the 
area of climate change they were reluctant to centralise climate policy monitoring in the 
European Commission or the European Environment Agency (Hildén et al., 2014; 
Schoenefeld et al., 2016), even though greater standardisation had been repeatedly 
recommended by researchers (Mela & Hildén, 2012). So although the Monitoring 
Mechanism has been revised twice (in 2004 and 2013 respectively)4, “[…] less than 10% 
                                                 
4
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/monitoring/index_en.htm 
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of the entries in the 2011 reporting cycle included quantitative data based on ex post 
evaluations […]” (Hildén et al., 2014, p. 898). In other words, most of the monitoring 
generates ex-ante predictions of what member states hope their policies will deliver 
(Hildén et al., 2014; Schoenefeld et al., 2016). Furthermore, EU member states are 
reluctant to allow the Commission to elicit more detailed, policy-specific data; many 
prefer to report on the effectiveness of ‘bundles’ of policies rather than individually 
(Hildén et al., 2014). Withholding information on individual policy instruments could be 
one strategy to mask the ineffectiveness of particular policy instruments in order to 
protect particular ‘instrument constituencies’ (Voß & Simons, 2014; see also Kerr, 2007). 
Taken together, while the EU has regularly estimated the impacts of its climate policies 
since the early 1990s, little of this activity draws on ex-post data; in fact there is 
considerable political resistance to giving EU-level actors more control (Schoenefeld et 
al., 2016). 
Meanwhile, the Commission has also tried to harmonise climate policy evaluation 
among member states. In 2009 and 2012, it commissioned two studies with a view to 
streamlining standards (AEA et al., 2009; Öko-Institut, Cambridge Economics, AMEC, 
Harmelink Consulting, & TNO, 2012). However, these studies were rather critical of 
harmonisation. For example, the Öko-Institut (2012, p. iv) identified various obstacles to 
methodological streamlining, concluding that there was no ‘one size fits all’ solution to 
evaluation (see also Toulemonde, 2000). On-going technical disputes over measuring the 
greenhouse gas content of certain sources have further undermined efforts to promote 
greater centralisation. A controversy between the EU and Canada over the cumulative 
greenhouse gas emissions from the production of oil from tar sands showed that even 
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relatively technical estimates about the greenhouse gas content of certain fuels can at 
times become intensely political (see Neslen, 2011). It is also worth noting that the 
drivers of centralisation vary considerably at the EU member state level: Mela and Hildén 
(2012) found that the UK had issued considerably more guidance than other EU member 
states. 
Taken together, enacting common evaluation standards and methods has created 
intense political conflict (Schoenefeld et al., 2016). However, EU member states have 
often attempted to relegate this to the domain of the ‘unpolitical’ (see Hildén et al., 2014). 
Thus, while governmental actors appear to be investing in evaluation (see above), the 
other putative strengths of more top-down and hierarchical approaches have not yet 
materialized, namely with a view to generating common evaluation and monitoring 
standards. 
 
Informal common standards and methods 
The right top quadrant of Figure 1 contains common standards and methods, 
enacted by societal actors, who also engage in evaluation activities. One prominent 
example is the ‘European Environment Evaluators Network’ (EEEN), which belongs to 
the much larger, international ‘Environmental Evaluators Network’. It aims to bring 
environmental evaluators together in order to facilitate knowledge exchange.5 However, 
while a range of formal and informal actors are now involved, the original impetus for 
this network appears to be formal, driven by the United States (US) Environmental 
Protection Agency and the US-based National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, a non-profit 
                                                 
5 http://www.environmentalevaluators.net/purpose/ 
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grant-giving conservation organisation overseen by the US federal government6. Rather 
than proposing evaluation standards, these organisations endeavour to spread evaluation 
knowledge and ‘best’ practice. Another, more climate policy-focused example is 
Climate-Eval7, a “community of practice set up by the IEO [Independent Evaluation 
Office of the UN’s Global Environmental Facility] with donor support in 2008…” (Uitto, 
2016, p. 111). It maintains an email list, publishes guides on policy evaluation (see 
Woerlen, 2013), and maintains a database of evaluation studies. Similar to the EEEN, this 
is an international ‘community of practice’ that works through informal, peer to peer 
knowledge exchange and learning. This approach has also manifested itself in the 
emergence of evaluation societies in numerous countries and at EU level (Jacob et al., 
2015). 
Informal actors have also become involved in organising evaluation knowledge. 
In contrast to academia, where knowledge management and database systems are 
relatively advanced, to date there are no integrated evaluation knowledge management 
systems in evaluation (however, sub-systems do exist in some fields such as development 
aid—see Liverani & Lundgren, 2007). In the area of climate change, several actors have 
attempted to create databases of evaluation documents. Important (but still limited) 
examples include an online database managed by the European University Institute8, one 
in Germany focusing on renewable energy policy evaluations9, another managed by the 
                                                 
6 http://www.nfwf.org/whoweare/Pages/home.aspx#.VOXD_HbrHII 
7 https://www.climate-eval.org/about 
8 https://cprubibliography.wordpress.com/ 
9 http://www.forschungsradar.de 
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Climate-Eval initiative10, and the Architectures of Evaluation approach11 pursued by the 
US Environmental Protection Agency and the EEA. Crucially, however, formal, 
governmental actors support the German and the Climate-Eval databases. 
Another, and arguably different approach to standardising climate evaluation is to 
certify evaluators. For example, Thomas Dreesen suggested the possibility of creating an 
organisation of ‘chartered’ energy efficiency evaluators at the 2014 International Energy 
Program Evaluation Conference in Berlin (see Cooney, Dreesen, Lees, & Titus, 2014), an 
idea that is already being practised by the Japanese Evaluation Society on general policy 
evaluation (Jacob et al., 2015). Generally, this idea appears to be picking up steam in the 
evaluation literature (see McDavid & Huse, 2015). The idea is to create a structure 
similar to that of chartered accountants. Such proposals have emerged because of a 
growing awareness that evaluation is simply too context-specific for standardised 
methods. Hence, the idea is to generate a group of certified professionals to conduct 
evaluations. 
Taken together, there are numerous informal actors that have tried to standardise 
evaluation practices, usually through networks, knowledge exchange activities and 
professional accreditation. While these actors have created some evaluation databases, in 
the area of climate policy they have so far not been able to produce common evaluation 
standards and/or metrics. Crucially, and somewhat at odds with the expectations of 
polycentric governance theorists (see E. Ostrom, 2005), a significant impetus for these 
initiatives has come from governmental actors, or at least actors that receive considerable 
                                                 
10 https://www.climate-eval.org/eLibrary 
11 http://www.environmentalevaluators.net/archee/ 
Schoenefeld and Jordan: Governing Evaluation 
 
 22 
central governmental support. This support has in turn enabled other organisations to 
join. In other words, governmental actors are by no means the only ones driving 
evaluation, given that informal actors often collaborate to work towards more cohesion in 
climate policy evaluation. 
 
Commonly negotiated standards and methods 
At the EU level, the European Environment Agency (EEA) is at the centre of 
many networks of actors who shape climate policy evaluation standards. As Martens 
(2010) explains, those that established the EEA in 1991 disagreed on its role: while the 
Commission and a number of Member States wanted it to generate environmental data, 
the European Parliament envisioned that it would adopt an independent and/or policy 
scrutinizing role (see also Waterton & Wynne, 2004). While these disagreements were 
eventually buried in ambiguous language in the regulation that established the EEA, the 
politics never entirely disappeared. Particularly in the first decade of its existence, 
tensions emerged between the EEA and the Commission’s Directorate–General (DG) for 
the Environment, with the former seeking a stronger policy-analysis role, and the latter 
preferring more data collection (Martens, 2010).  To this day, the initially strong 
emphasis on data collection remains (Martens, 2010; Mickwitz, 2013), but the EEA has 
started to indicate a willingness to engage in more policy evaluation (EEA, 2016). 
The EEA plays a key role on climate policy evaluation in the EU because it 
operates the EU’s Monitoring Mechanism for greenhouse gases and, increasingly, 
policies and measures to reduce them (EEA, 2016). Clearly, the revision of the 
Monitoring Mechanism and the significant concessions made by the Commission in this 
process (see above) can be understood as ultimately producing a set of ‘negotiated’ 
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evaluation standards (Hildén et al., 2014). For example, in a public consultation on plans 
to revise the mechanism, many respondents voiced their dissatisfaction with the existing 
situation.12 The negotiations took place between the national level (EU member states) 
and the EU level (Commission), but also included the European Parliament, which had to 
formally sign off the new regulation (Schoenefeld et al., 2016). These negotiations were 
arguably conducted in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (see Börzel & Risse, 2010), because EU 
member states held the upper hand. They knew that a very weak revision of the 
Monitoring Mechanism could result in ever-more centralised climate policy evaluation 
later on. It remains to be seen whether the EEA will exploit any available leeway to drive 
monitoring in the direction of policy evaluation. 
However, it remains an open question whether these negotiated standards are 
sufficient: scholars have recently raised doubts about the validity of the data provided 
through the Monitoring Mechanism (Hildén et al., 2014; Schoenefeld et al., 2016). More 
broadly, Aldy (2014) has highlighted that the policy monitoring standards negotiated 
under the UNFCCC, which underwrite the EUs monitoring mechanism, are insufficient 
to track climate policy over time. Taken together, it remains unclear whether independent 
actors such as the EEA can negotiate and use standards that are sufficient to compare 
policy over time and highlight potential shortcomings, particularly given the strongly 
political nature of the negotiations. Climate policy evaluation in the EU thus reveals some 
scope for, but also very real political limits to, changing the balance between evaluation 
and monitoring (Schoenefeld et al., 2016). 
 
                                                 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/docs/0008/results_en.pdf 
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A la carte standards and methods 
Given many gaps in empirical evidence, scholars know much less about the right bottom 
quadrant in Figure 1. Existing literatures highlight the great variety of actors involved in 
evaluation across the EU. As Versluis and colleagues (2011, p. 224) write: “[…] EU 
evaluation culture is political and pluralistic, characterized by a variety of organizations 
willing to pay significant sums of money to finance research that may produce data in 
support of their political views.” Evidence from the only available large-scale meta-
analysis of climate policy evaluation documents suggests that a range of formal and 
informal actors evaluate climate policies across the EU (Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 
2011). The European Commission is one of the most active producers of evaluation 
knowledge across sectors (Mastenbroek et al., 2015). Hildén (2014) writes that with 
regard to the landmark EU emissions trading scheme, informal evaluators, such as the 
Union of the Electricity Industry, have commissioned many evaluations. In addition, 
informal academic evaluators have also become ever more important (Hildén, 2014). 
While Elinor Ostrom (2005, p. 283) argued that smaller organisations can in 
principle pool resources in order to conduct evaluations, current literatures suggest that 
the extent this is happening in EU climate policy is rather limited, although there are 
some notable exceptions such as the Climate Action Tracker (see Fransen & Cronin, 
2013, for a review). When this happens, it can also generate significant benefits for local 
organizations: for example, by turning ‘100% renewable’, the village of Feldheim in 
Germany has attracted worldwide attention (Ratzesberger, 2014). 
In the meta study conducted by Huitema and colleagues (2011), less than 10 of 
the 259 evaluations analysed were conducted by industry or trade associations; indeed, 
the number of evaluations done by non-governmental organisations was less than 20 
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between 1998 and 2007. Thus, current data cast doubt on whether climate policy 
evaluation is likely to self-organise in the way that Ostrom (2005) suggested. As far as 
evaluation standards are concerned, Huitema and colleagues (2011) found that goal 
attainment and effectiveness were most widely used, as were a range of other criteria. 
This rather limited set of frequently used criteria could allow for some comparability in 
determining evaluation results. In another, smaller meta-analysis of climate policy 
evaluation studies, Mela and Hildén (2012) found that cost effectiveness was a more 
commonly used criterion, but concluded that climate policy evaluation practice tends to 
be very heterogeneous across the EU. Crucially, significant doubts remained as to 
whether informal evaluation can fill gaps left by formal evaluation actors, particularly 
with a view to critically reflecting on extant policy goals (Huitema et al., 2011; see also 
Fischer, 2006). Furthermore, there is currently no database or central repository of 
informal climate policy evaluation documents. In fact aside from Huitema et al. (2011), 
nobody has collected - let alone analysed - informal policy evaluation practices. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper started from the premise that there is much to be gained from bringing 
together insights from governance and evaluation to reflect upon the governance of 
policy evaluation itself. To test this out, this paper combined insights from evaluation 
studies on formal and informal evaluation with governance theories on hierarchical and 
polycentric governance to generate a novel typology. The paper thus makes a key 
theoretical contribution towards engaging with governance theory in order to comprehend 
and perhaps ultimately govern patterns of evaluation conducted by many different kinds 
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of actors—an approach which leading evaluation scholars have long called for (e.g., 
Stame, 2006; 2008) and which goes well beyond existing efforts to establish common 
‘evaluation policies’ within single organizations (see Trochim, 2009).  
The paper then subjected the typology to a ‘plausibility probe’ (Eckstein, 2000) 
using the case of climate policy, a very dynamic policy area in the EU in which many 
efforts have been made to engage in monitoring and evaluation (EEA, 2016). Marshalling 
the currently fragmented and partial stock of existing empirical material helped to fuller 
understand and make sense of climate policy evaluation activities in the EU, and drew 
attention to what is at stake, both theoretically and empirically. By doing so, the paper 
demonstrates that combining theoretical insights from governance and evaluation 
literatures generates a number of pertinent research questions that have received too little 
attention thus far. More precisely, each quadrant in our typology contains a unique 
combination of strengths and weaknesses of different modes of evaluation practice and 
governance—with no obvious indication of which governance mode is ‘better’. The 
answer to the latter question will likely depend on the substantial policy field, as well as 
actor preferences on what evaluation is expected to achieve. For example, the analysis 
shows that formal, state-led evaluation does not necessarily have to be hierarchical, as 
governmental evaluators may work at various, decentralised levels (such as in federal 
systems). 
However, from what patchy empirical evidence exists in the realm of climate 
policy, it appears that the strengths of each quadrant have at best only partially 
materialized, and the weaknesses remain ever-present across the typology. This state of 
affairs highlights the need for more targeted forms of data-driven analysis on evaluation 
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governance, including in a range of other policy sectors that this paper could not 
consider, but where this typology may also be usefully applied, and which therefore 
constitutes an important venue for future research. Many of the absolutely critical 
dilemmas that emerge from our typology – such as the independence of evaluators, the 
publication of evaluation results and the ability of different governance centres to learn 
from one another – are difficult to resolve given the paucity of empirical evidence. 
Shedding more light on these dynamics might also be useful for those seeking to 
govern evaluation activities. The availability of many different governance options, 
which Figure 1 sought to distil, means that important questions are at stake. Who gets to 
decide what evaluation governance mode is most suitable? Whose preferred criteria are 
most relevant for what is perceived as a ‘functioning’ evaluation system? As the paper 
detailed above, new evaluation activities will themselves generate winners and losers 
(e.g., those who receive funds to produce evaluations, and those who do not, or those 
whose funds are cut because they are being diverted towards evaluation activities), and 
thus be the focus of political struggles over resource distribution, access, legitimacy and 
others. Future research should focus on exploring these dynamics in much greater detail 
than this article has been able to accomplish. 
Future research should also consider the interactions between different modes of 
organisation and/or explore the extent to which reality may simultaneously exhibit 
aspects of some or even all four quadrants. For example, it is known that on occasions 
governmental organizations do allow evaluators considerable independence thus 
ameliorating some of the potential drawbacks of formal evaluation (Chelimsky, 2006; 
2009; Uitto, 2016). This is especially relevant giving the growing interest in other forms 
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of co-governance (e.g., Tosun, Koos & Shore, 2016). Our analysis reveals that, for 
example, formal-informal interactions appear relatively common, but much more detailed 
empirical investigation is needed to understand how they perform. As a first step, it 
would be helpful to build a more comprehensive database of formal and informal 
(climate) policy evaluation documents and then use evaluation and governance theory to 
analyse it, as well as interview actors to probe some of the underlying political and 
process-based aspects of evaluation. Work along these lines could provide a much needed 
opportunity to investigate the actor categories identified in this paper more thoroughly. 
While our probe shows that the categories may blur somewhat in practice (see also Guha-
Khasnobis, Kanbur, & Ostrom, 2006), they provide useful theoretical yardsticks to 
anchor a discussion about different approaches to policy evaluation. For example, many 
‘informal’ civil society organisations receive substantial EU funds (Greenwood, 2011). 
Such explorations could help shed light on the extent to which governors are able to 
choose freely from the menu of governance modes depicted in our typology.  At present, 
some do appear to require much more self-organising capacity and coordination than 
others, the potential sources of which are still far from clear. 
Finally, in addition to the public policy focus that this paper adopted, non-policy 
approaches, such as are appearing in the so-called transnational governance realms, are 
becoming more important in climate domain (e.g., Chan et al., 2016; Bulkeley et al., 
2014). For example, the international Covenant of Mayors, which addresses energy 
efficiency governance in cities, highlights the need to monitor and evaluate these and 
other softer, network-based form of governing.13 Similarly, the Compact of Mayors to 
                                                 
13 http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/actions/monitoring-action-plans_en.html 
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address climate change has established systems to track progress towards publically 
stated targets.14 But little has been done to monitor and evaluate such initiatives (see for 
example Chan et al., 2016; Widerberg & Stripple, 2016). Indeed, scholars have barely 
begun to map their existence. 
Such research could help to refine policy evaluation systems not only in the EU 
(see EEA, 2016), but also with respect to other actors who may wish to evaluate. This is 
particularly pertinent in the wake of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), whose 
backbone is a new, 5-year review and transparency mechanism. This mechanism strongly 
links with energetic and fast-moving debates on developing successful climate policy 
monitoring and evaluation arrangements (Aldy, 2014; Aldy & Pizer, 2015; Aldy, Pizer & 
Akimoto, 2016; Feldman & Wilt, 1996; Jordan et al., 2015; Fransen & Cronin, 2013; 
Schoenefeld et al., 2016). Over time, national emission reduction targets are expected to 
become more stringent as the pledge and review mechanism kicks in (if not the 
probability of achieving the meta policy goal of keeping warming within two degrees 
Celsius will be extremely low). But it will become much harder for countries to fulfil 
their targets at reasonable cost in the absence of sound systems for evaluating individual 
policies and measures. In the past, the EU has had less need to evaluate its own policies, 
given that its climate targets have been comfortably attained through ‘non-climate policy’ 
effects, such as the ‘dash for gas’ in the UK or economic restructuring following 
reunification in Germany (Jordan, Huitema, Van Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010). But 
going forwards, governors are likely to face much more pressing demands to know which 
of their various policies are really performing (and on what criteria). Well-developed 
                                                 
14 http://www.iclei.org/details/article/global-mayors-compact-shows-unity-and-ambition-to-tackle-climate-
change-1.html 
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evaluation systems could in principle furnish such knowledge, which will build trust 
within and, crucially, between countries. The EU has historically occupied a leading role 
in designing ways to govern evaluation in the UN climate agreement (Yamin & 
Depledge, 2004, p. 327). The Paris Agreement arguably provides a new ‘opportunity 
structure’ for many more actors to become involved in climate governance (Tosun & 
Schoenefeld, 2016), not least through the means of evaluation. 
But it is important to recognize that, however organized or governed, evaluation 
does not exist in a vacuum. There are likely to be interactions between the way policy 
evaluation functions and is organized and the structure and functioning of wider 
governance systems. Furthermore, there are related forms of evaluation, such as ex-ante 
impact assessment, that could be subjected to similar questions. Much like the evaluation 
practices themselves, the forms of evaluation governance remain very much in flux. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Theoretical strengths and weaknesses of formal and informal evaluation 
Formal (state-led) evaluation Informal (society-led) evaluation 
Strengths: 
 better uptake? 
 inside knowledge, more realistic 
 
Weaknesses: 
 lack of independence, less critical 
 little publication if evaluations are 
negative 
 governments trying to influence 
evaluators 
Strengths: 
 more critical? 
 more publication/public discussion? 
 Lower conflict of interest/influence of 
governmental actors 
 Greater scope to be ‘reflexive’ and 
focus on side-effects 
 
Weaknesses: 
 Lack of internal knowledge/realism? 
 Lower uptake/fewer incentives to use 
results unless there is public pressure 
 Limited or lopsided funding; not self-
organising? 
 Interest-driven? 
 
Based on: Hildén and colleagues (2014), Huitema and colleagues (2011), and Weiss 
(1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Strengths and weaknesses of hierarchical and polycentric evaluation 
Hierarchical evaluation Polycentric evaluation 
Strengths: 
 common standards/comparability 
 coordination – little duplication, 
perhaps better knowledge diffusion? 
 funding/support? 
Strengths: 
 Acknowledges self-organising 
capacities; more localised ‘ownership’ 
of evaluation activities 
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 More evaluation capacity 
 
Weaknesses: 
 insensitivity to context  key in 
policy success 
 may be perceived as ‘policing’  
actors unwilling to 
evaluate/cooperate? 
 High risk of systemic failure; difficult 
to address problems/change course 
 What if there is no central actor with 
sufficient resources to evaluate (e.g., 
UNFCCC?) 
 ‘Uncomfortable’ evaluation results 
more likely to emerge, particularly if 
addressing influences from different 
governance levels 
 sensitivity to context 
 low risk of systemic failure  if one 
part of the system fails, there are still 
many others 
 Does not rely on a single actor 
 
Weaknesses: 
 Multiple standards, hard to compare? 
 Collective action problem – policy 
evaluation/knowledge as a common 
pool resource? 
 Lack of resources at lower levels; lack 
of evaluation capacity 
 
Based on Elinor Ostrom (2010; 2014) and Vincent Ostrom (1999). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Approaches to governing policy evaluation 
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